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The purpose of this technical report is twofold:
1. to critically examine the ITDfl flSUJ barrier and area search
models for mathematical accuracy and modelling reasonableness, and
2. to report on the use of ITDfl programs on
USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70) during a 16 day period of high intensity,
exercise operations (RIMPflC 86).
Available for examination were ITDfl Ver. 1 (including the BASIC
language source code), the more recent ITDfl Ver. 2 (without source
code), and the JOTS II Technical Reference Manual (Ref. 1] Reference is
made in this report to Version 1 source code to explain the functioning of
the Version 2 program. This was required because the Version 2 source
code was unavailable. Fortunately, the barrier and area search modules-
appear functionally very similar, if not identical, in both ITDfl versions.
So the lack of Version 2 source code is not judged to be especially
critical to this examination.
flSlii Barrier Search Model
Brief Description of Model. , The ITDfl flSUJ barrier search model is
accurately described in Ref. 1. Its description here is primarily to
establish notation.
The barrier search model estimates the probability of detection of a
target submarine penetrating a back-and-forth fiSLU barrier (Figure 1.].
The barrier penetration is considered in "target-stationary relative
space". That is, the target is assumed to be stationary, and all relative
speed for the encounter is provided by the searcher. The searcher's
relative speed component across the barrier front is
Vs costal,
inhere Vs is searcher speed, and a is the barrier advancing angle (when
ct>9] or retiring angle [uuhen et<0). The component of relative speed
perpendicular to the barrier is
V T + V s sinta),
inhere V T is target speed.
amet window, U
\ Barrier length, B
S* •-*.'• •'•~-y
Figure I. Barrier Geometry
For barrier penetration points uniformly distributed across a target
window (UJ!, the probability of the target coming within range R of the
searcher (PD) is the ratio of the drffa "covered" by the searcher in
relative space to the total area that could be occupied by the target In
Figure 2. the covered area is shaded. In the ITDR barrier search model,
this area is obtained by numerical integration Allowance is made for
sensors which sweep less than .369° by reducing the detection range R.
Figure 2. Calculation of P
Discussion . Rlthough the modelling concepts used are good, there are
some minor problems in the implementation.
1. The calculated P D is too large for target window sizes (UJ) less than
2(B/2 - RK). This problem results because the limits of the numerical
integration are, in some instances, improperly set. Specifically, in line
51970 of the ITDR Ver. 1 BASIC code, the upper limit of integration is
B/2 - RK. It should be min (B/2 - RK, UU/2). With the original limits, the
integration can be performed outside the target window. III. This
increases the calculated P D above the proper value. To illustrate with
an example, let
R = detection range = 18 nrn
V s = searcher speed = 19 knots
V' T
= target speed = 18 knots
B = barrier width = 88 nrn
LU = target window = 18 nrn
ot = advancing/re tiring angle = 8





The ITDR model gives a probability of detection of 1. However, for any
W^IB - 2RK], the correct answer is 2RK/B = .35.
2. P D is improperly calculated when either Vs costa) or V T - V s sin(a]
is negative. The cause of this problem is that the integrand in the
numerical integration in line 51168 of the BRSIC code is allowed to
become negative whenever
Ksqr = V s coslad / (V T + V s sink*]) < 8.
Rdding negative terms in the numerical integration results in the
calculated P D being too small. To illustrate, continue the previous
example with LU = 188 nrn and a = -18°. Then P D is correctly calculated as
.31. Setting a =- 178° should give the same result, but yields .29.
The failure becomes particularly spectacular when the denominator
of Ksqr is exactly 8. For example, setting
R = 18 nrn
Vs = 28 knots
v T = 10 knots
B = 88 nrn
LU = 198 nrn
a = -39°
results in a P n of 1.42 x 18 6 .
R simple fix for this problem is only alloiu a such that
-90° < a < 90° and V T + V s Sintck) > 0.
The other cases are either redundant or result in the searcher moving
"south 1 ' faster than the target.
3. Sweeping sensors are modelled in an unusual manner. The user is
given the option of calculating P D under the assumption that the
detecting sensor sweeps ±8° either side of a center bearing. The
effective detection range then becomes Rsin(min(6,90°)). The problem
with this approach is that it assumes that the center bearing is along the
relative track of the searcher, fin more reasonable assumption is that
the center bearing be along the searcher's absolute (i.e., geographic]
track. See Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Orientation of Swept Area
These two assumptions lead to significantly different calculated
probabilities of detection. For example, in the limit as 8 and &. decrease
to 0, the ITOfi model gives a probability of detection of 9. Whereas
assuming that the sensor is looking directly ahead along a fixed line of
bearing gives a probability of detection of mind, R/UJj. Note that in this
case, there is no increase in P D as the searcher increases speed (i.e., no
kinematic enhancement). The probability of detection is simply that
fraction of the possible barrier penetration points that are covered by
the finite detection "ray" of the sensor. For nonzero values of 6 and oc,
similar closed form expressions can probably be derived, although the
geometry becomes more complex and performing the numerical
integration may be preferred.
4. This is a comment, not a problem. For ck=0° and a 368° sensor, it is
possible to approximate the ratio of the shaded cirea to the total area in
Figure 2. without numerical integration. True, the HP9820 is not being
computationally stressed by the integration, but there is something to
be said for the simplicity of closed form solutions. Using the notation
introduced, the probability of detection given a barrier penetration is
approximately
Pn =
min(2RK/B. 1) for LU $ B-2RK
1- (1/UJB)lmax 1.5(6 + 111) - RK, 0J) 2 for B-2RK <UJ>;: B + 2R
((B + 2R)/w\l (1 - (max (B - R(K-1), Qlj 2 /(B 2 +2RB)) for LU >, B + 2R




as before. To obtain this expression for P D ,
the circular boundary of the shaded area in Figure 2. is replaced with a
straight Line. The resulting region has an area which is greater than or
equal to the area of the original shaded region. So this calculation gives
an upper bound for P . Figure 4. is a comparison plot of P calculated by
the ITDfl model and the approximation above. The ITDfl model values
greater than .35 are in error and result from improper Limits of
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Figure 4. Comparison of ITDR Model. Results and Approximation
5. This is a second comment. One advantage of using numerical
integration for evaluating P D is that it can accommodate a nonuniform
distribution of target penetration points. This advantage is not
exploited in the current barrier search program. For example, if the
target knows that the barrier is in place, then an attempt might be made
to penetrate near the one of the ends of the barrier to minimize P D . If
numerical integration is used to evaluate P D , then it is a simple matter to
weight the possible barrier penetration points according to any specified
probability distribution. Specifically, if the barrier penetration point x
has a probability density function g(x] and P D(x] is the probability of
detection given a barrier penetration at x. then
P D = J PD(x] g(x] dx
HI I x
s.t q<x)>Q
6. fl third comment, fl possible problem with this advancing/retiring
barrier methodology is that the detection probabilities are conditional on
the target's penetration of the barrier. Changing the angle of searcher's
advance or retreat mill affect both the probability of detection given
barrier penetration and the probability of barrier penetration The
second effect is not accounted for in this model. For example, a
retreating barrier can dramatically increase the probability of detection
given a barrier penetration, but it also reduces the probability of such a
penetration during any specified time interval. In the limit as the
searcher speed perpendicular to the barrier increases to the target
speed, the predicted P D increases to 1. However, the target can not now
overtake the retreating barrier, so the probability of a barrier
penetration occurring at all becomes zero. This line of argument
suggests that the calculated probabilities of detection may be too large
for retiring barriers and too small for advancing barriers.
flSUJ Area Search Model
Brief Description of Model , fls described in Ref. 1, probability of
detection for an area search is given by
Fv, = l-exp(-2RVR t/fl), in
where
R = detection range
fl = search area size
t = time allowed for search
V's = searcher speed
v' T = target speed, and
VR = mean relative speed
2*




+ 2V sV Tcos <J>jV2 d<t> (2)
6
Discussion
1. The mean relative speed calculation can be made more efficient.
In the original BASIC code and in Ref. 1, the calculation of V R is as shown





- 2VcV Tcos $)
1/2
d<J> . (3)
Equation 13] makes use of the symmetry of the cosine function to reduce
the extent of the numerical integration., and has the correct sign for the
2V sV T cos<t> term in the Laiu of Cosines. These problems are to some
extent cosmetic, as cosine symmetry causes both (2) and (3) to give the
same numerical results.
It is noted that VR can be approximated with the following closed
form expression:
V R/V S ~ .36 max(V T/V s , 1) + .64 M + !V T/V S } 2 ) 1/2 (4)
Figure 5 contains plots of the estimated V R/V S versus VT/VS and a
multiplicative correction factor to convert the estimated values to true











.36 MAX(Vt/Vs,1) + .64(l+(VtAsf)
1/2
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Figure 5. Estimated Relative Speed Ratio vs Speed Ratio
2. fl Monte Carlo area search simulation mas conducted to test the
accuracy of Equation 11). The search geometry is shown in Figure 6. The
searcher starts in the Lower left corner of a 188 nm x 189 nm search area
and conducts a systematic search at speed V s with a cookie-cutter
sensor having a range of 19 nm. The target's starting position is
uniformly distributed over the search area. The target conducts a
random tour at speed V T with a mean time between course changes of 1
hour. That is, the target track consists of connected line segments,
each of which has a course selected from an independent, uniform
distribution between 9° and 369°. find the time on each leg is selected
from an independent, exponential distribution with mean 1 hour. When















Figure 6. Simulation Geometry
Seven simulations iuere conducted, each with Vg and V T selected so that
the mean relative speed, as calcuated from Equation 13), mas 15 knots
The results arp plotted in Figure 7, together with P D calculated from
Equation 111 The fit between (1) and the simulation was reasonable when
Vc and Vy were nearly equal. Otherwise the fit was not especially
impressive.
The simulation results were sensitive to the mean time between
target course changes and the searcher track used (neither of which are
represented in Equation (lj). In particular, the simulation showed that a
search track starting near the center of the search area gives better
search performance, especially for small values of v s .
3. The need for an area search simulation. For this are^ search
example, Equation [1] does not model a systematic search for a randomly
moving target very accurately, find unfortunately the search literature
has little else to offer in the way of closed form expressions for P D
when the target track is random and the searcher conducts a systematic
search (e.g., parallel sweeps, spiral in, or spiral out). This suggests that
some sort of numerical solution, probably a lionte Carlo simulation, may
be required to assess the effectiveness of such an area search. This
simulation could be very general. It could allow, for example:
1. different areas for the target and searcher,
2. a customized target motion model (e.g., patrol or transit)
3. any desired search track,
4. multiple searchers and targets,
5. counterdetection by the target.
Mean Relative Speed is 15kts
Mean Rate of Course Changes is 1/hr
20 40
TIME (hrs)
Figure 7. Probability of Detection by Simulation
Output could include the searcher track(s) and graph of probability of
detection by time t. LUith a cursor or Lightpen input of area boundaries
and track points, problem setup time would be reduced This simulation
might be of particular use for battle group flSUJ planning, since
frequently several RSUJ platforms search for the same target
submarine
fit Sea Observations
Back ground . During the period 2-18 June 1986, the author, as a
commander in the Naval Reserve, was attached to the staff of
Commander Carrier Group Three fit that time, the staff was embarked
on USS CARL VINSON (CVN 701 and operating in support of the exercise
RIMPfiC 86.
RIMPflC 86 was a two-carrier battle group, multinational exercise
involving approximately 68 ships and 30,800 at-sea personnel The
purpose was to demonstrate the fleet's ability to operate effectively
against a realistic air, surface, and subsurface threat During this
exercise, use of the ITDfl system by the carrier group staff and CRRL
VINSON ship's company was observed.
Exercise Scenario. The general scenario was that a coup had toppled
the pro-West government of White Country (represented for purposes
of the exercise by the Hawaiian Islands). The US naval response was to
send two carrier battle groups (Ranger and Carl Vinson] to White
Country as a show of force These battle groups were opposed by
some 60 ships simulating Soviet platforms, fls the exercise progressed,
the battle groups approached White Country close enough to launch air
strikes. Opposing surface action groups and submarines engaged as the
battle groups came into range.
JOTS and DOTS. The ITDR system on CRRL VINSON is called VINSON
DOTS, which appears to be a one-of-a-kind installation, funded by
DRRPfl. through NOSC, San Diego. There mas no formal documentation
for this system aboard CRRL VINSON., but the overall program structure
and functional modules seem very similar to the older JOTS. In fact.,
much of the BASIC code has been carried over directly from JOTS (as
indicated by documentation comments in the BRSIC code]. The principle
DOTS enhancements included the organization of the contact database
and the implementation of automated input of LINK 11 data.
The controlling terminal for VINSON DOTS is an Hewlett-Packard 9020
located in the War Room of the Flag Spaces. Feeding this station is
another HP 9928 in the Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC). This unit
processes and correlates intelligence information generated off the
shin. The correlator-tracker used is POST (Prototype Ocean Surveillance
Terminal) Rlso feeding into the Flag HP 9029 is real-time NTDS (Link 11]
data. The Flag terminal displays and operates on available contact
data and also sends this data to HP 9029 machines in the RSLU Module
(RSLUMOD) and Combat Direction Center (CDC). Rnother HP 9020 is located
in the Tactical Operations Plot (TOP) which runs JOTS III and is currently
not in the VINSON DOTS network (and so does not have access to real-
time NTDS information).
The VINSON DOTS network accepts data only from the Flag terminal.
and these data currently come from three sources: 1) manual input, ZJ
NTDS input, and 3] POST input.
The NTDS input is automated and requires no human filtering.
Automated input is also available from POST, but due to the
classification of some POST data, this feature is not presently
implemented. To remove the more sensitive data, POST contact
information must be manually sanitized and then entered into the
VINSON DOTS database from the Flag terminal, flu torna tic samtization
and entry of POST data is a planned enhancement.
Even though contact data to be shared over the network must be
entered from the Flag 9029, any other terminal may be used to enter or
modify contact information to be used exclusively on that terminal.
This allows users to customize their databases.
Use of DOTS Aboard CVN 70. Of the many tactical decision aids that DOTS
provides, the principle observed uses during P.IMPflC 86 were:
1. Maintaining an contact history database for the exercise,
containing all surface, air, and subsurface contacts.
For each detection recorded, some or all the following data were
saved, time, location, target course and speed, detecting sensor and
detection parameters (dimensions and orientation of elliptical spas or
bearing spread and inclusive ranges for bearing boxes). In addition,
JOTS III (but not DOTS] provides a comment field which was used
extensively by the TOP watchstanders (responsible for maintaining the
surface plot).
2. Plotting current or past contact positions.
There mere two principle ways this capability was used:
a. Displaying the current position of some group of contacts leg.,
Blue surface ships), or
b Displaying the contact history (i.e.. track] of a few contacts.
Color and NTDS symbology were effectively used to identify the
platform type and threat status (hostile, friendly, or unknown).
The processing and display of Link 11 data transfer was fast enough
to follow the air war. This was demonstrated during several air raids
on the battle group where actual aircraft were used, (fl-3's simulated
bombers with R-4's and fl-7's flying as air-launched cruise missiles]
3. Performing time/distance navigational calculations.
- e.g., if BATES was undenway from San Diego OSDO on 2 June, could
she be in the Hawaiian Operation area by 9800 on 18 June with a 15 knot
speed of advance?
7 with a IS knot speed of advance going through specified points,
where will the contact be in 24 hours?
4. Plotting spas, patrol areas, 4-UJhiskey grid (i.e., screen)
assignments
5. Preparing "executive summaries" of the contact situation.
No direct use of the RAW, ASUU or ELU decision aids was observed,
although several of the Carrier Group Three staff members were very
knowledgeable in their use.
o
Observed Problems.
1. Resolution on the HP 9928 screen was insufficient to display many
contacts. (The POST display, using an HP 9Q20C machine, was much
better]
2. TOP matchstanders used JOTS III rather than DOTS because JOTS
III is more complete.
5. The HP Think jet printer generally only provided marginally
acceptable hard copy. The installed thermal printer on some of the
HP 9920 machines provided a finer resolution output.
References
11 J JOTS II Technical Reference Manual . Commander Naval flir Force, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet, May 1984, CONFIDENTIAL.
DISTRIBUTION LIST
NO. OF COPIES















Center for Naval Analyses
2000 Beauregard Street
Alexandria, VA 22311
Operations Research Center, Room E40-164
Massachusetts Institute of Technology




Blk A, Stockport Road
Singapore 0511
Naval Air Development Center
Attn: Dr. M. Leonardo
Warminster, PA 18974
Naval Air Development Center
Attn: LCDR R. Hudson
Warminster, PA 18974
Navy Tactical Support Activity
Attn: Mr. A. Letow, Director
P.O. Box 1042





3 2768 00302445 6
